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The More Divergent, the Better?
Lessons on Trilemma Policies
and Crises for Asia
JOSHUA AIZENMAN AND HIRO ITO∗
This paper investigates the potential impacts of the degree of divergence in open
macroeconomic policies in the context of the trilemma hypothesis. Using an
index that measures the extent of policy divergence among the three trilemma
policy choices—monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and financial
openness—we find that emerging market economies have adopted trilemma
policy combinations with the smallest degree of policy divergence in the last 15
years. We then investigate whether and to what extent the degree of open macro
policy convergence affects the probability of a crisis and find that a developing
or emerging market economy with a higher degree of policy divergence is more
likely to experience a currency or debt crisis. We also compare the development
of trilemma policies around the crisis period for the groups of Latin American
crisis countries in the 1980s and the Asian crisis countries in the 1990s. We find
that Latin American crisis countries tended to close their capital accounts in the
aftermath of a crisis, while that is not the case for the Asian crisis countries. The
Asian crisis countries tended to reduce the degree of policy divergence in the
aftermath of the crisis, which possibly meant they decided to adopt open macro
policies that made their economies less prone to a crisis.
Keywords: impossible trinity, international reserves, financial liberalization,
financial crisis, exchange rate regime
JEL codes: F31, F36, F41, O24
I. Introduction
Managing policies amid economic turbulence is never an easy task, especially
when the world economy is highly integrated and markets are intertwined. History
is full of episodes where a certain international monetary system or regime meets
an abrupt end such as the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s
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or during the financial crises experienced by many emerging market economies
in the 1980s and 1990s. These abrupt endings of regimes often involve crises or
some sort of financial turbulence. No matter what form of international monetary
system or regime they decide to replace the old ones with, countries always end up
adopting a combination of three policy goals: monetary independence, exchange rate
stability, and financial openness, with different degrees of attainment in each, that
is, a powerful hypothesis called the “impossible trinity” or the “trilemma” dictates
open macro policy management. Countries may simultaneously choose two—but
not all—of the three policy goals to the full extent, or adopt a combination of
intermediate degrees of all or two of the three policy goals.
Theory and empirical evidence also tell us that each one of the three trilemma
policy choices can be a double-edged sword as recognized by a significant amount
of recent literature.1 To make matters more complicated, the effect of each policy
choice can differ depending on the policy choice it is paired with. For example,
exchange rate stability can be more destabilizing if paired with financial openness,
while it can be stabilizing if paired with greater monetary autonomy.
Furthermore, countries rarely face the stark polarized binary choices often
envisioned by policy makers and researchers. In the textbook trilemma triangle
(Figure 1), each of the three sides represents the full attainment of the three policy
goals. We can locate the euro system or the gold standard at the corner representing
complete financial openness and exchange rate stability, while the Bretton Woods
system can be placed at the corner representing complete exchange rate stability and
monetary independence. When a country attempts to mix all three policy choices,
implementing these at intermediate levels, such a combination would be located
somewhere inside the trilemma triangle. The bottom line is, as Mundell (1963)
argued, the extent of achievement of the three policy choices must be linearly
related to each other.2
Obviously, different policy combinations must have different macroeconomic
effects. Now, the question is, how can the location of a country’s policy combination
in the trilemma triangle affect its macroeconomic performance, especially in terms
of avoiding traumatic economic turbulence such as financial crises?
Against this backdrop, we first construct in Section II a metric that measures
the degree of divergence among the three trilemma policies while incorporating its
relative position to the global trend. With this index, we then evaluate the patterns
of divergence of trilemma policy combinations in the last 4 decades. In Section III,
1For monetary independence, refer to Obstfeld et al. (2005), Shambaugh (2004), and Frankel et al. (2004).
On the impact of the exchange rate regime, refer to Ghosh et al. (1997), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), and
Eichengreen and Leblang (2003). The empirical literature on the effect of financial liberalization is surveyed by Henry
(2007), Kose et al. (2006), Prasad et al. (2003), and Prasad and Rajan (2008).
2In other words, if there are measures representing the levels of attainment in the three policy choices, such
measures must add up to a constant. This has been empirically proven by Aizenman et al. (2012), and Ito and Kawai
(2012).
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Figure 1. The Trilemma Triangle
Source: Authors’ representation.
we implement a series of empirical exercises to examine the impact of the degree of
trilemma policy divergence on macroeconomic performance, namely the probability
of the onset of currency, banking, and debt crises. At the end of this section, we also
compare the degree of policy divergence and trilemma policy arrangements between
the Latin American crisis countries in the 1980s and the Asian crisis countries in
the 1990s, and identify commonalities and differences between these crisis periods.
In Section IV, we present the main findings and conclusions of the paper.
II. Divergence of the Trilemma Policy Choices
A. Why Does the Extent of Policy Divergence Matter?
While there are only three kinds of polarized policy combinations among
the three trilemma policies, i.e., the three vertexes in the triangle in Figure 1, once
intermediate levels for each policy are allowed, there can exist an infinite number
of open macro policy combinations. Until recently, researchers have tended to focus
on debating the merits and demerits of polarized monetary regimes. Fischer (2001)
argued the unstable nature of intermediate exchange rate regimes, pointing out
that such regimes are more prone to experience a crisis in a financially globalized
world. Frankel (1999), while admitting that regimes with “corner solutions” can
be simple and transparent in showing government commitment to maintaining a
regime, argued that avoiding intermediate regimes is not always the best solution
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for countries, especially developing ones. Willett (2003) argued that the issue is not
so much about whether polarized or intermediate regimes are more or less stable,
but about whether the macroeconomic conditions of an economy are consistent with
its monetary regime. The crises that occurred among emerging market economies
in the 1980s and 1990s and, to a similar extent, the global financial crisis of 2008–
2009, have raised questions about the global trend of financial liberalization, leading
researchers to debate the merits and demerits of greater financial openness.
Despite the debate, regimes with corner solutions are more of a rarity. In other
words, most countries often operate “somewhere inside the triangle.” For example,
some countries implement partial financial integration while trying to retain control
over exchange rate movement and preserving monetary policy autonomy. This sort of
clustering of the three policies inside the trilemma triangle, or the “middle-ground
convergence,” has been characteristic of emerging market economies (EMGs in
this paper) in recent decades as observed by Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2012).
The authors also note that such middle-ground convergence has been more evident
among Asian EMGs in recent years.
By adopting converged policy combinations, these economies may have been
trying to dampen the negative effects that may arise from adopting polarized policy
regimes. Interestingly, the period when middle convergence started to become more
evident among EMGs coincides with the time when some of these economies began
to accumulate sizable international reserves (IR) as if trying to buffer the trade-off
arising from the trilemma, again a more evident trend among Asian EMGs.3
A natural question that arises is how the location within the trilemma triangle
can affect macroeconomic performance, especially when we focus on the risk of
experiencing a financial crisis, which this paper focuses on. Before exploring this
question, however, we want to raise one more important issue, that is, even if certain
open macro policy combinations were found to affect the likelihood of a country
experiencing a crisis, such correlations may not be merely a function of the country’s
own macroeconomic policies.
A country’s open macro policies need to be evaluated in greater context,
compared with policies adopted by other countries. For example, a fixed exchange
rate regime would have different effects on the economy depending on whether
or not most of the other countries also adopt fixed exchange rate regimes as they
did during the Bretton Woods period. As another example, the consequence of
liberalizing financial markets should also differ between the 1960s, when most of
the countries also had closed financial markets, and in recent years, when many
countries have been moving toward the direction of full financial liberalization.
3Aizenman et al. (2010) empirically show that pursuing greater exchange rate stability can increase output
volatility for developing economies, but that this effect can be mitigated by holding a greater amount of international
reserves than the threshold of about 20% of GDP.
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When we think about the history of international monetary systems, countries
anecdotally have tended to adopt monetary regimes prevalent in other countries,
making the types of monetary regimes across countries correlated with each other.
Such correlated behavior can be global as in the case of the gold standard in the
pre-World War II era or the Bretton Woods system, regional as in the euro system,
or clustered around similar income levels as evidenced by the recent middle-ground
convergence observed among emerging market economies.
When many countries tend to adopt similar monetary regimes, this herding
behavior would create externalities, lowering the cost of a country following such a
global or regional trend, or the “mean behavior.” Conversely, herding behavior in the
choice of monetary regimes could also raise the opportunity cost of deviating from it,
unless the country that deviates from the “mean behavior” has healthy fundamentals
or solid institutions including well-functioning financial markets. In this sense, the
pursuit of forming a monetary union by some European countries, we could argue,
can be sustainable only if they are equipped with appropriate levels of institutional
development and good fundamentals.4 Hence, again, it is important to evaluate the
combinations of open macro policies in a global context or in comparison to other
countries.
In this paper, we will particularly focus on the impact of a triad policy
combination on the likelihood of financial crisis. By financial crisis, we mean three
kinds of financial crises: currency, banking, and debt crises. While it may not be
difficult to consider the relationship between the degrees of policy divergence and
their impact on currency crisis, the same may not be true for a banking or debt crisis,
where the relationships may not be as straightforward. However, the macroeconomic
performance in a banking or debt crisis, or the probability of its occurrence, can be
direct functions of the triad policy coordination.
As regards a banking crisis, the recent European experience makes it clear
that the choice of monetary regime can affect the likelihood of a banking crisis.
In the case of the euro crisis, participating in the monetary union had made it
easier for certain countries such as Ireland, Spain, and Cyprus to experience a surge
in capital flows in an unsustainable fashion. Such capital influx ended up sowing
seeds of the ongoing banking and debt crises in these countries. The situation could
have been different if these countries had not participated in the fixed exchange
rate arrangement because such a regime rids countries with highly open financial
markets of monetary independence.
The debt crisis in emerging market economies in the 1980s and 1990s and
that in Southern Europe such as Greece can also be explained similarly in the
context of the trilemma. For emerging market economies, the predominant global
trend for financial liberalization had turned the trilemma into a dilemma between
4Furthermore, it means the current crisis situation faced by some of the euro countries can be explained by
their weak fundamentals and institutional development.
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pursuing greater monetary autonomy (with more flexible exchange rates) and greater
exchange rate stability (with less monetary autonomy). Facing the “original sin”
(Eichengreen and Hausman 1999), many emerging market economies had chosen
the path of greater exchange rate stability while the inevitably weaker monetary
independence made these economies more vulnerable to external shocks.
Thus, not just for currency crisis, but also for banking or debt crisis, how
the three trilemma policies are coordinated by individual countries and where they
stand in the global context can be important factors.
B. Measure of Policy Divergence and Its Patterns
To see how much convergence or divergence is taking place among the three
trilemma policy choices and to be able to evaluate it in a global context, we construct a
“measure of divergence” in the triad policies. For that, we use the “trilemma indexes”
introduced by Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2010, 2012).
The trilemma indexes measure the degree of achievement in each of the three
policy choices for more than 170 economies from 1970 to 2010.5 The monetary
independence index (MI) is based on the correlation between a country’s interest
rate and the base country’s interest rate. The index for exchange rate stability (ERS)
is an invert of exchange rate volatility, i.e., the standard deviation of the monthly rate
of depreciation, using the exchange rate between the home and base economies. The
degree of financial integration is measured by the Chinn–Ito (2006, 2008) capital
controls index (KAOPEN).6
Using these indexes, we define the “measure of policy divergence” as:
dit =
√
(MI r − 1)2 + (ERS rit − 1)2 + (KAOPEN rit − 1)2 (1)
where X rit = XitX t for X = MI, ERS, and KAOPEN, and Xt is the cross-country
average of X in year t.7,8 Appendix 1 lists all the countries for which d is available.
5The indexes are available at http://web.pdx.edu/∼ito/trilemma_indexes.htm.
6Refer to Aizenman et al. (2012) or the index’s website for the details of construction of the indexes.
7The cross-country average (Xt ) is the sample average of X including both industrialized and developing
countries for year t.
8One could argue that if the extent of achievement of the three trilemma policy choices is linearly related as
theoretically predicted, the above formula for d does not have to contain all the three indexes—it would need only
any two of the three trilemma indexes. However, we do not assume the linearity to hold strictly, i.e., the linearity
does not have to hold every single year. In other words, we assume that there is some room for policy choices to
deviate from the trilemma constraint. In fact, policy makers sometimes intentionally or unintentionally challenge the
constraint of the trilemma by implementing a policy combination that is not consistent with the trilemma hypothesis.
Before aborting the fixed exchange rate arrangement for the Thai baht, Thai policy makers attempted to challenge
the trilemma by pursuing both greater monetary independence and exchange rate stability without imposing capital
controls. Also, holding a massive amount of international reserves may allow countries from deviating from the
constraint of the trilemma in the short run.
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Figure 2. Degree of Policy Dispersions among Different Income Groups of Economies
Source: Authors’ computations.
1. Long-run Trends
Figure 2 illustrates the average of the policy divergence measure, dit, for
different subgroups of economies based on income levels.9 We can make several
interesting observations based on this figure. For the last 2 decades, advanced
economies tended to have combinations of distinctive policies. Not surprisingly, the
euro country group has the highest degree of policy divergence among the country
groups, followed by the group of non-euro advanced countries. Higher income
countries may be able to afford to have divergent policy combinations.
The group of emerging market economies has had the lowest degree of policy
convergence in the last 2 decades. Since the beginning of the 1980s, developing
economies, whether or not they are emerging markets, have had relatively stable
movement in the degree of policy convergence, except for the mid-1990s when
both subgroups of developing economies experienced a drop in the degree of policy
divergence. Interestingly, the policy convergence measure tends to rise around the
times of the crises, such as during 1982, 1997–1998, and 2008–2009, or the Mexican
debt crisis, Asian financial crisis, and global financial crisis, respectively.10
We are also curious to see if there are any regional characteristics in the
formation of triad open macro policies. As we have discussed, externalities can
9Country groupings are shown in Appendix 1.
10To see what is driving the trajectories in Figure 2, it is helpful to look at the group mean of the ratios of each
of the three indexes to its cross-country mean, i.e., Xit
X t
, with X for monetary policy independence (MI), exchange rate
stability (ERS), and financial openness (KAOPEN). For this, one can refer to Aizenman and Ito (2012).
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Figure 3. Degree of Policy Dispersions among Different Regional Economies
Source: Authors’ computations.
play a role in concerting policy decisions of neighboring countries in a region
while possibly increasing the cost of shying away from regional policy coordination.
Furthermore, there can be regional economic integration such as in the case of the
East Asian supply chain network or a monetary policy arrangement as in the case
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Hence, comparisons among geographical
groups of economies should shed another ray of light on the differences in the
characteristics of triad open macro policies among economies. Figure 3 illustrates
the averages of the policy dispersion measure for different regional country groups
but focusing on Latin American and Asian economies.
We can make an interesting observation that since the last few years of the
1990s, which coincides with the Asian crisis period, the degrees of policy divergence
have been persistently small among all regional groups.11 This policy convergence
among developing economies may reflect the great moderation, but the convergence
seems to be still in place in the last few years of the sample corresponding to the
years of the global financial crisis. Additionally, despite their high levels of policy
divergence in the 1980s, emerging market economies in Asia have been experiencing
their lowest levels of policy divergence in the last decade.12
11This is also true for Middle Eastern or North African countries (not reported).
12Asian emerging market economies (and countries in the Middle East, though not reported) experienced
high levels of policy divergence from the beginning of the 1980s to the early 1990s. This is partly because Latin
American countries, many of which went through debt crises, retrenched financial openness around the same period,
dragging down the average and making financial liberalization efforts by Asian emerging market economies especially
distinctive.
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Figure 4. Average of the Measure of Policy Divergence over Currency Crisis
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of economies included in calculating the average.
Source: Authors’ computations.
2. Behavior of d around the Time of a Crisis
Let us observe the behavior of the measure of policy dispersion around the
time of a financial crisis. Figures 4–6 show the development of the cross-country
average of the degree of policy divergence for different subsamples of economies
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Figure 5. Average of the Measure of Policy Divergence over Banking Crisis
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of economies included in calculating the average.
Source: Authors’ computations.
in the periods covering currency, banking, and debt crises (specifically, the time
spanning 3 years before the first year of the crisis and 3 years after, i.e., [t0 –
3, t0 + 3]).13 In each figure, Panel (a) shows the development of the subsample
averages of d for industrialized economies (IDC), developing countries (LDC), and
13The methods for identifying the three types of crises are explained in Appendix 2.
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Figure 6. Average of the Measure of Policy Divergence over Debt Crisis
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of countries included in calculating the average.
Source: Authors’ computations.
EMGs.14 Panel (b) shows the development of the averages of d for crisis countries
that experienced positive output losses as a result of a crisis (top) and those that
14We define EMGs as the countries classified as either emerging or frontier during the period of 1980–1997
by the International Financial Corporation, plus Hong Kong, China, and Singapore.
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experienced output gains (bottom).15 Panel (c) compares the development of the
averages of d for the crisis countries with high IR holdings from those having low
IR holdings, where “high” means that IR holdings as a share of gross domestic
product (GDP) is higher than the annual cross-country median of all the countries
in the entire sample, including crisis and non-crisis economies as of the year before
the crisis occurrence (t0 – 1).
We can make several interesting observations. In all three kinds of crises, d
follows a hump-shape pattern with the peak occurring at the first year for currency
crises (t0); a year after onset for banking crises (t0 + 1); and a year before onset
for debt crises (t0 – 1). In currency and banking crises, for crisis countries that
experienced output losses, the measure of policy divergence tends to stay at high
levels during the first and second years of the crisis. In the case of crisis countries
that did not experience output losses, d tends to peak the year before the onset
of the crisis. This may imply that these countries could avoid output losses by
preemptively implementing stabilization measures that end up raising the degree of
policy divergence.16
For the currency or banking crisis countries with low IR holding, there is
a distinct rise in d at the onset of the crisis and a distinct fall afterwards. For
countries with high IR holdings, however, the peak occurs in the second year of the
crisis. This generalization is more apparent for the high IR holding countries with
output losses (not reported). These findings suggest that if a country experiences
a currency or banking crisis and does not hold high levels of IR, the country
needs to implement policies that raise d, whereas d peaks more slowly for high IR
holders.
It is harder to generalize the movement of d for debt crisis countries. Panel (c)
shows that holding higher levels of IR seems to allow a crisis country to raise d prior
to the onset of a crisis. However, debt crisis countries that experience a peak in d
prior to the onset of a crisis tend to be the ones that experience output losses, which
seem to be contrary to the cases of currency or banking crisis countries. Those with
high IR holdings tend to lower the level of d around the time of the crisis, which
again we do not observe among currency or banking crisis countries.
There is a limit to what we can infer from observing unconditional means of
the measure of policy divergence around the time of the crisis. We now move on to
a more formal analysis on the degree of policy divergence and examine how d can
affect the probability of crisis onsets.
15Output losses are defined as the cumulative sum of the differences between actual and trend real GDP over
the 4-year period, i.e., [t0, t0 + 3]. Trend real GDP is based on the HP-filtered real GDP series over the 20-year-long
pre-crisis period [t0 – 20, t0 − 1]. A crisis is defined to involve output losses or gains based on whether the cumulative
sum is positive or negative. In a sense, the existence of output losses is based on “output losses in ex post,” not strictly
as of the first year of the crisis.
16We do not treat d as an exogenous variable; that is, d can respond endogenously to a crisis.
THE MORE DIVERGENT, THE BETTER? 33
III. Empirical Analysis
A. Probability of Crisis Occurrence
We now estimate the probability of different types of crises to examine
whether and to what extent the degree of relative policy divergence affects the
likelihood of a currency, banking, or debt crisis. The identification methods for each
of the crisis are explained in Appendix 2.
For each type of crisis, we assign the value of 1 to a binary variable yt
when country i experiences the onset of a crisis in year t, and 0, otherwise.17
We hypothesize the probability that a crisis will occur, Pr(yt = 1), is a function
of a vector of characteristics associated with observations in year t, or Xt, and the
parameter vector β,with the control variables inX lagged 1 year to avoid endogeneity
issues. Using the panel data composed of more than 100 economies for the period
1970–2010, the log of the following function is maximized with respect to the
unknown parameters through nonlinear maximum likelihood.18
ln L(β) =
m∑
i=1
[yt ln F(β
′Xt ) + (1 − yt ) ln(1 − F(β ′Xt ))] (2)
where m indicates the number of economies times the number of observations for
each economy and the function F(.)is the standardized normal distribution.
The following variables are included in the vector of characteristics, Xt. The
choice of the variables is based on past literature, except for that related to the degree
of trilemma policy convergence. The variables included in the estimation are the
following:19
(i) Relative income to the US – Per capita income levels from the Penn World
Table (PWT) are normalized as a ratio to the US per capita income level.
(ii) International reserves (IR) – IR holdings, excluding gold, as a ratio to GDP.
(iii) Per capita output growth – The growth rate of GDP per capita (in local
currency).
(iv) Private credit growth – The (first-difference) change in the ratio of private
credit creation to GDP.
(v) Net debt inflows – The ratio of (external debt liabilities – external debt assets)
to GDP. Original data are from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007 and updates).
17We only focus on the onset of a crisis, that is, the first year of the crisis. This means that we do not investigate
the persistence of a crisis situation if it lasts longer than 1 year.
18The economies included in the estimation are those with an asterisk in Appendix 1.
19Unless mentioned otherwise, data for these variables are extracted from publicly available datasets (such as
the World Development Indicators, International Financial Statistics, and World Economic Outlook).
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(vi) Gross external financial exposure – The ratio of (total external assets + total
external liabilities) to GDP, also from the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti dataset,
included as deviations from the 5-year average of the ratios. After the global
financial crisis, in addition to net capital flows or investment positions, gross
capital flows have been identified as a potential destabilizing factor.20
(vii) Real exchange rate overvaluation – Defined as deviations from a fitted trend in
the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate is calculated using the exchange
rate between economy i and its base economy (Aizenman et al. 2011) and the
consumer price inflation (CPI) of the two economies. Higher values of this
variable indicate that the real exchange rate value is lower (i.e., appreciated)
than its time trend.
(viii) Exchange rate stability (ERS) and financial openness (KAOPEN) – Both are
from the trilemma indexes of Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2012).
(ix) Triad policy divergence measure – The discussed measure of triad policy
divergence, dit.
(x) Standard deviation of the triad policy divergence measure – The standard
deviation of dit over a period of 5 years from t–5 through t–1. This is included to
examine the impact of the stability level of the trilemma policy combinations.
(xi) Other crises – The dummies for the other types of crises that occur either
concurrently (t) or in the previous year (t–1) are also included.
(xii) Contagion – To see the impact of other crises in the same geographical region,
we also include a variable that represents the effect of regional contagion. The
variable to be included is defined as:
Contagionni,t =
PK∑
j=1
j =i
ω jK · CDni,t (3)
where CDni,t is a crisis dummy for type n crisis (i.e., currency, banking, or debt)
and ω jk is the weight based on GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) for economy
j ( j = i) in region K. Hence, the variable Contagionn is the weighted sum of the
dummy variables for the economies in the region economy i belongs to, excluding
the weighted dummy of economy i itself.21 The basic assumptions are, 1), the more
economies in the same geographical region experience crises, the more likely it is
20See Borio and Disyatat (2011); Obstfeld (2012a, 2012b); and Bruno and Shin (2012) for the arguments
on how gross external financial exposure matters for financial and economic stability. However, it must be noted
that gross external financial exposure may also mean a higher level of ability to diversify risk, which may work as a
stabilizing factor.
21The regions we consider are: North and South America, East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific, South
Asia, Europe (including both Western, Eastern, and Central Europe), and Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and
North Africa.
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for economy i to experience a crisis, and 2), that the contagious effect is larger for
bigger economies.
We apply the above probit estimation model to the full sample that includes
both industrialized and developing countries, the IDC sample, the LDC sample, and
a subsample of EMGs. The baseline estimation results are reported in Table 1, which
reports the marginal effects of the explanatory variables assuming that variables take
mean values (except for the dummy variables).22,23
B. Estimation Results: The Determinants of Crisis Occurrences
We make observations of the estimations mainly for the samples of developing
and emerging market economies.
1. Currency Crisis
Most of the explanatory variables turn out to be qualitatively consistent with
the findings in the literature (e.g., Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999, Kaminsky et al.
1998, Glick and Hutchison 2001, and Kaminsky 2003), though statistical signifi-
cance varies by the sample group. Countries with real appreciation (compared to
the time trend) tend to experience a currency crisis, but significantly only for the
group of industrialized countries. Rapid growth in private credit creation (as a ra-
tio to GDP) leads to a currency crisis especially for emerging market economies.
Not surprisingly, externally indebted countries tend to experience a currency crisis.
However, despite the prevalent strong belief of its effectiveness, IR holdings do not
affect the probability of the onset of a currency crisis.
For developing countries, a country experiencing a banking crisis concur-
rently or in the previous year tends to experience a twin crisis with a currency
crisis—banking crisis increases the probability of a currency crisis by 10–12 per-
centage points. Debt crisis, however, does not seem to lead to a twin crisis with a
currency crisis.
Regional contagion is also found to affect the probability of a currency crisis.
The more countries experience either a currency or banking crisis in the same region,
the more likely it is for a country to experience a currency crisis, although a debt
crisis does not have such a contagion effect.
22The variables that are persistently insignificant and therefore dropped from the estimation include: trade
openness, measured by the sum of export and import values as a ratio to GDP; the dummy for countries’ engagement
in both internal and external armed conflicts; the dummies for commodity exporters and manufacturing exporters; the
degree of fiscal procyclicality, which is measured by the correlation between HP-detrended output and government
expenditure; the dummy for the existence of deposit insurance; volatility of terms-of-trade income shocks; and the
dummy for hyperinflation (with the annual rate of inflation exceeding 40%).
23In the estimation for debt crisis, the estimation results for the full or IDC sample are not reported because
there is no debt crisis data for industrialized countries in our sample period (which ends in 2010).
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Interestingly, we find that developing or emerging market economies that
pursue more divergent triad policies from the global trend (as of the year prior to
the crisis) are more likely to experience a currency crisis, but the opposite impact is
true for industrialized countries, while the degree of triad policy stability does not
matter for any of the subsamples. The positive impact of greater policy divergence
on the likelihood of a currency crisis occurring among developing countries may
mean that adopting a combination of open macro policies that deviates from the
global trend would involve opportunity costs for these countries. This may explain
why many developing countries have tended in recent years to either adopt triad
policies with middle-ground convergence, or hold a massive amount of IR, or both.
In contrast, for industrialized countries, a combination of diverse policies might help
countries avoid a currency crisis, though the effect is only marginally significant.
This suggests that industrialized countries can afford to pursue a higher degree of
policy divergence with their established policy credibility.
2. Banking Crisis
Generally, the banking crisis estimations also yield results qualitatively con-
sistent with other studies on the same subject (for instance, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and
Detragiache 1998, von Hagen and Ho 2007, Joyce 2011, and Duttagupta and Cashin
2011), though with varying levels of statistical significance. Unlike in the currency
crisis estimation, the amount of IR holdings matters for the onset of a banking
crisis and lowers the probability of a banking crisis occurring among developing
and emerging market economies. Developing or emerging market economies with
faster credit growth tend to experience banking crisis, though such is not the case for
industrialized countries. While the extent of real exchange rate overvaluation does
not matter, the degree of exchange rate stability marginally increases the probability
of the onset of a banking crisis for emerging market economies. Greater external
financial exposure does increase the probability of a banking crisis for developing
countries.
Banking crisis is also found to be contagious for developing or emerging
market economies. If other economies in the same region experience a banking
crisis, this could cause a banking crisis in the home economy. Also, we again have
evidence of twin currency and banking crises.
Neither the degree of triad policy divergence nor the degree of instability of
the triad policies affects the probability of a banking crisis occurring for any of the
subsamples. Among the three types of financial crises, a banking crisis seems to
be the most weakly linked to the extent of triad policy divergence. One possibility
for the weak link is that a certain monetary regime affects other macroeconomic
conditions in such a way that these conditions would have a more direct impact on
the financial system.
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In column (7) of Table 1, which reports the estimation results for the LDC
group, credit growth and financial exposure were found to be positive contributors to
the likelihood of an occurrence of a banking crisis. We can surmise that triad policy
divergence affects the probability of a banking crisis occurring, but only through
these two variables. Capital can flow to markets that are distinctively different from
other markets. In the literature, it has been argued that a policy regime with high
degrees of exchange rate stability and financial openness would often make an
economy more conducive to the influx of capital flows, eventually experiencing a
boom and bust cycle. That tendency can be stronger if a certain market or economy
adopts a monetary regime that is more distinct from the global trend—which can
be captured by d—compared to when many others adopt a similar monetary regime
(e.g., the Bretton Woods system). In sum, the effect of triad policy divergence could
be masked by changes in macroeconomic conditions that might have a bigger impact
on the likelihood of a banking crisis.
3. Debt Crisis
Not surprisingly, the more indebted externally a country is, the more likely
it is to experience a debt crisis. While greater external financial exposure does not
contribute to the probability of a debt crisis, a country pursuing greater exchange
rate stability tends to experience a debt crisis. This result suggests that countries
with fixed exchange rate regimes experience moral hazard in their debt financing—a
fixed exchange rate policy may induce overborrowing in hard currency. It may also
be possible that a country with a fixed exchange rate tends to procrastinate its policy
adjustments even when macroeconomic conditions require an adjustment (usually
devaluation) of its currency, letting the peg duration increase the political cost of
devaluation. These findings are consistent with the negative impact of IR holding
on the probability of a debt crisis occurring.
Currency crisis in the same region could also lead to an occurrence of a
debt crisis. The significantly negative sign on the debt crisis contagion variable
is somewhat puzzling. However, this may mean that once a country in the same
geographical proximity, especially an economically larger one, experiences a debt
crisis and goes through some form of rescheduling, such actions may calm down
the sovereignty bond market for other countries in the region with similar income
levels.
Again, a higher degree of triad policy divergence tends to lead to a debt
crisis. If a country pursues a distinctly more divergent triad policy compared to
the global trend, this may cause stress on the economy. Possibly, investors would
start suspecting the sustainability of the country’s policy management and therefore
question its future ability to repay the debt. Such stress may become self-fulfilling
and eventually force the country to experience a debt crisis. The instability of
the triad policy combination also matters though only with marginal significance.
40 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW
This also implies that unstable open macro policy management may weaken the
credibility of the country in terms of its policy management and debt sustainability
and lead investors to launch a speculative attack on the country’s sovereign bond
markets.
4. Impact of IR Holdings
Can the impact of the degree of triad policy convergence, d, on the probability
of crisis occurrence be conditional on another factor, such as IR holdings? One may
expect that a greater amount of foreign reserves might help lessen the positive effect
of d on the probability of experiencing a crisis. If that is the case, countries with
lower amounts of IR holdings may be likely to experience a crisis once they increase
the levels of d, while those with higher amounts may not. To examine this, we re-
estimate the probit model while dividing the sample into two groups: one composed
of country-year pairs with IR holdings that are higher than the annual median (as
of t − 1) and the other comprising those with IR holdings that are lower than the
median.
Table 2 reports the results for IR holdings, d, the volatility of d, and pri-
vate credit growth for both high and low IR regimes.24 The coefficient on d is
statistically significant among low IR holders for the debt crisis estimation while
it is not significant for high IR holders. These findings are consistent with our
prior. However, for the currency crisis estimation, the estimate on d is significant
for the high IR holding regime for both developing and emerging market groups.
This result is somewhat counterintuitive. To interpret this result, it is possible that
economies with high IR holdings experience other macroeconomic symptoms that
create an environment where higher policy dispersion can lead to an occurrence of a
crisis.
Interestingly, private credit growth is a positive contributor to the likelihood
of a currency or banking crisis occurring in developing or emerging market countries
that have high IR holdings. However, this is not the case for low IR holders. Private
credit growth is also not a significant contributor to the probability of a debt crisis
occurring irrespective of the IR regime. These results suggest that in the high IR
regime, IR holdings tend to induce higher credit growth, which may in turn lead to
a currency or banking crisis. In such an environment, pursuing a higher degree of
policy divergence is riskier and tends to lead to a currency crisis. The distinct role
of private credit growth in currency and debt crises may explain the twists in the
results of their estimations.
24The estimates of the other variables (i.e., those not reported in Table 2) are omitted from the presentation
to conserve space. They are available from the authors upon request.
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Furthermore, the finding that, for the low IR regime, the estimate on the
IR holdings variable is persistently negative among all the samples and significant
among most of them, suggests that the effect of IR holdings can be nonlinear. In
other words, the effect of an incremental change in the level of IR holdings may be
larger for lower IR holders than for higher IR holders.
C. What Do the Estimation Results Tell Us about the Experiences
in Latin America and Asia?
Now, we examine what we can learn from the estimation results as well as
actual crisis experiences. In particular, we take a look at the two big crisis episodes
in the 1980s and 1990s, namely the Latin American debt crisis in the early 1980s
and the Asian crisis of 1997–1998.
Figure 7 shows the averages of d around the crisis period for the Latin
American and Asian country groups.25 The year of a crisis onset (year 0 in the
graph) differs between the sample groups, and also among the countries within the
Latin American group. For each Latin American country, year 0 indicates the year
when the crisis is the most severe among the years 1981, 1982, or 1983.26 For the
Asian countries, year 0 is always 1997. The figure illustrates the sample average of
d over the period from 5 years before (t0 – 5) through 5 years after (t0 + 5) the crisis
year.
From the figure, we can see that Latin American countries tend to have
higher d in the period prior to the crisis compared to their Asian counterparts.
Second, for this group of crisis countries, the policy divergence variable increases
over the post-crisis period. Third, for the Asian group, d rises rapidly when the
crisis breaks out, making it look like more countries are increasing the level of
policy divergence in response to the occurrence of a crisis. Fourth, unlike their Latin
American counterparts, d drops in the second year after the crisis for the Asian
countries and remains at relatively low levels afterwards.
The fact that d remains at relatively lower levels in the post-crisis period
may suggest that Asian countries have possibly adopted policy combinations that
would help reduce the likelihood of repeating a crisis. As far as the post-crisis period
is concerned, Asian crisis countries appear more crisis-proof than Latin American
countries in the 1980s.
Considering the previous finding that the positive correlation between the
degree of policy dispersion and the likelihood of a currency crisis survives even if
25The Latin American crisis countries include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The Asian crisis countries include Indonesia,
the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.
26The year with the “most severe crisis” is identified among the years 1981, 1982, and 1983 as the starting
year for different types of crises that occur in the following consecutive years, or the year when a twin or triple crisis
occurs.
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Figure 7. The Average of the Measure of Policy Divergence for Latin America and Asia
Note: Latin America includes: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Asia includes Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand. For each of the Latin American countries, year 0 indicates the year when the crisis was
the most severe among the years 1981, 1982, and 1983 (i.e., year 0 varies among the countries). For the Asian
countries, “year 0” is 1997.
Source: Authors’ computations.
a country holds a large amount of foreign reserves (Table 2), Asian crisis countries’
efforts to maintain lower levels of policy dispersion from the global trend do matter
and may have helped these countries to stay less crisis-prone in the post-crisis
years.
In Figure 8, we can observe the development of the measure of policy di-
vergence for individual crisis countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and
Mexico in panel (a) and Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, and Thailand in panel (b). The individual countries’ experiences provide
interesting information that may be masked by the average behaviors illustrated in
Figure 7.
First, the movement of d is more diverse among Latin American crisis coun-
tries than their Asian counterparts. Second, the degree of diversity is especially
greater before the crisis-breakout year for Latin American countries and diminishes
as years go by in the post-crisis period. Among Asian countries, except Indonesia,
the level and movement of d tends to be more homogenous, which suggests that
the extent of policy coordination is greater in the Asian region. Third, among the
countries in Asia, the peak of d tends to be clustered around the first year of a
crisis occurrence, preceded by lower levels of d, and followed again by lower d, but
moderately higher than in the pre-crisis years. Such a generalization is not appli-
cable to Latin American countries. Last, as we observed in Figure 7, Asian crisis
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Figure 8. Measures of Policy Divergence for Latin American and Asian Crisis Countries
Note: Latin America includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Asia includes Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand. For each of the Latin American countries, year 0 indicates the year when the crisis was
the most severe among the years 1981, 1982, and 1983 (i.e., year 0 varies among the countries). For the Asian
countries, year 0 is 1997.
Source: Authors’ computations.
countries tend to implement policy combinations in a way that homogeneously leads
to declining d over post-crisis years, which is not observable among Latin American
crisis countries.
Figure 9 takes a closer look at the policy combinations of the countries
from the two regions. It illustrates the development of the sample averages of
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Figure 9. Average Deviations from the Means for Each Trilemma Index over a Crisis
for Latin America and Asia
Note: Latin America includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Asia includes Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand. For each of the Latin American countries, year 0 indicates the year when the crisis was
the most severe among the years 1981, 1982, and 1983 (i.e., year 0 varies among the countries). For the Asian
countries, year 0 is 1997.
Source: Authors’ computations.
mean deviations for each of the three trilemma policy indexes (i.e., MI r = MI/MI,
ERS r = ERS/ERS, and KAOPEN r = KAOPEN/KAOPEN) for both groups. This
figure allows us to see how the movement in the three trilemma indexes is driving
the results we saw in Figures 7 and 8.
According to this figure, while both Latin American and Asian countries
experienced the crisis with relatively high levels of financial openness, Latin
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American countries significantly reduced the level of financial openness in the post-
crisis period. The mean deviations of the financial openness index (not reported)
show that countries such as Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, and Argentina reduced the de-
gree of financial openness with respect to the global trend significantly. Asian crisis
countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia also reduced the level of financial open-
ness but by a lesser degree than their Latin American counterparts. Considering
that Latin American countries did not have high domestic savings in the pre-debt
crisis years while Asian countries did by the 1990s, the Latin American coun-
tries could have been more vulnerable to external shocks. That may explain the
difference in their responses, in terms of financial openness, in the post-crisis
years.
Both groups experienced a fall in the level of exchange rate stability, but the
extent of the drop is greater for Asian countries on average. The smaller decline in the
extent of exchange rate stability for Latin American crisis countries is partly due to
the relatively dispersed timing of abandonment of fixed exchange rate regimes. While
Asian crisis countries aborted their fixed exchange rate arrangements as soon as they
experienced a currency crisis, the responses of Latin American countries to a crisis
occurrence in terms of exchange rate stability differ widely across the countries.
Some countries allowed exchange rate flexibility immediately after experiencing a
crisis, while others tried to maintain exchange rate stability. Furthermore, all the
Asian countries, except for Malaysia, maintained exchange rate flexibility in the
5-year post-crisis period, while such homogeneity is not observed among Latin
American counterparts.
Asian crisis countries have maintained stable levels of monetary independence
throughout the pre-crisis and post-crisis period, though it did lose some degree
of monetary independence at the time the crisis occurred. As was the case with
exchange rate stability, the movement of the monetary independence indexes for
the Asian countries is much more homogeneous than for Latin American countries,
again suggesting greater policy coordination among these countries. On average,
Latin American countries moderately increased the level of monetary independence
a year before the crisis through 3 years after its occurrence.
Because of the way the variable d is constructed, if any of the three indexes is
far from the value of 1, the value of d would tend to rise. Given that, we can observe
that Asian crisis countries have maintained relatively low levels of d because they
tend to be “conformists” to the world trend in terms of monetary independence and
financial openness. Despite the often-discussed anecdotes, Asian crisis countries
have maintained relatively low levels of exchange rate stability, which allowed these
countries to have more conformist trilemma policy combinations.
Latin American countries in the post-crisis period in the 1980s tended to
have a combination of the three distinct policies. They retained high (i.e., greater-
than-average) levels of monetary independence with lower exchange rate stability.
Most importantly, these countries decided to seclude themselves from international
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financial markets. Ironically, such a policy response may have left the countries
exposed to a crisis-prone state—though there are surely other factors that contributed
to keeping them prone to a crisis.
Given these findings, what makes Asia different is that, despite the turbulent
experience of the Asian crisis, Asian countries have decided not to move away from
the global trend of financial liberalization. As Aizenman et al. (2011) show, these
economies seem to have decided to learn how to surf on the waves of financial
globalization rather than run away from them.
IV. Conclusion
We have examined the impact of open macro policies on the economies
from the perspective of the powerful hypothesis of the trilemma—an economy may
not simultaneously pursue full achievement of all three policy goals of monetary
independence, exchange rate stability, and financial openness. In this paper, we shed
light on a new aspect of the problem by focusing on the degree of policy divergence,
i.e., how far an economy’s trilemma policy combination differs from the world trend.
We find a wider variation in the degree of policy divergence across economies
of different income levels and geographical groups. Industrialized countries, most
notably the euro countries, have tended to adopt more diverse trilemma policy
combinations since the early 1990s. In the last 15 years or so, emerging market
economies have adopted trilemma policy combinations with the smallest degree of
policy divergence. Given that this group of economies has achieved relatively stable
output performance, lower levels of policy divergence may have been one of the
keys to their stability.
To investigate this, we formally tested the effect of the degree of policy
divergence on the probability of crisis occurrences. We found that a developing
or emerging market economy with a higher degree of policy divergence is more
likely to experience a currency or debt crisis. However, for industrialized countries,
a higher degree of policy divergence tends to reduce the probability of a currency
or banking crisis.
We also found that by holding large volumes of IRs, developing countries
can avoid facing the correlation between wider policy divergence and a higher level
of likelihood of experiencing a debt crisis—but high IR holders, interestingly, also
face a positive correlation between wider policy divergence and the likelihood of
experiencing a currency crisis. Our results also suggest a nonlinearity in the effect
of foreign reserves; that is, the effect of an incremental change in the level of IR
holdings may be larger for lower IR holders.
When we examined the development of trilemma policies around the crisis
period for Latin American crisis countries in the 1980s and the Asian crisis countries
in the 1990s, we found that these two groups of countries had gone through distinctly
different policy development patterns around the time of the crisis. The biggest
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difference between the two groups is that Latin American crisis countries tended
to close their capital accounts in the aftermath of a crisis, while this is not the
case among the Asian crisis countries. That Asian crisis countries tended to reduce
the degree of policy divergence in the aftermath of the crisis possibly meant that
they decided to adopt open macro policies that are less conducive to a crisis.
That decision has been paired with a strong incentive to hold a great amount of
international reserves. By observing how crisis-prone conditions can be perennial
for emerging market economies as what happened to Latin American countries,
Asian countries, including those that did not experience a crisis such as the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), seemed to have decided to become a cautious
implementer of open macro policies. In the highly integrated world economy, this
decision is no surprise to anyone.
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Appendix 1: List of Economies
Industrialized Countries
1 193 Australia∗ 46 522 Cambodia, (E)
2 122 Austria∗ 47 622 Cameroon∗
3 124 Belgium∗ 48 624 Cape Verde∗
4 156 Canada∗ 49 626 Central African Republic∗
5 128 Denmark∗ 50 628 Chad∗
6 172 Finland∗ 51 228 Chile∗, (E)
7 132 France∗ 52 924 PRC∗, (E)
8 134 Germany∗ 53 233 Colombia∗, (E)
9 174 Greece∗ 54 632 Comoros
10 176 Iceland∗ 55 636 Congo, Dem. Rep.
11 178 Ireland∗ 56 634 Congo, Rep.
12 136 Italy∗ 57 238 Costa Rica∗
13 158 Japan∗ 58 960 Croatia∗
14 181 Malta 59 423 Cyprus
15 138 Netherlands∗ 60 935 Czech Republic∗, (E)
16 196 New Zealand∗ 61 611 Djibouti
17 142 Norway∗ 62 321 Dominica
18 182 Portugal∗ 63 243 Dominican Republic∗
19 184 Spain∗ 64 248 Ecuador, (E)
20 144 Sweden∗ 65 469 Egypt, Arab Rep.∗, (E)
21 146 Switzerland∗ 66 253 El Salvador∗
22 112 United Kingdom∗ 67 642 Eq. Guinea∗
Developing Countries: (E) denotes 68 939 Estonia∗
emerging market economies 69 644 Ethiopia
23 914 Albania∗ 70 819 Fiji
24 612 Algeria∗ 71 646 Gabon
25 614 Angola∗ 72 648 Gambia, The
26 311 Antigua and Barbuda 73 915 Georgia∗
27 213 Argentina∗, (E) 74 652 Ghana∗, (E)
28 911 Armenia∗ 75 328 Grenada
29 314 Aruba 76 258 Guatemala∗
30 912 Azerbaijan 77 656 Guinea
31 313 Bahamas, The 78 654 Guinea-Bissau∗
32 419 Bahrain 79 336 Guyana∗
33 513 Bangladesh∗ 80 263 Haiti
34 316 Barbados 81 268 Honduras∗
35 913 Belarus 82 532 Hong Kong, China∗, (E)
36 339 Belize 83 944 Hungary∗, (E)
37 638 Benin∗ 84 534 India∗, (E)
38 514 Bhutan 85 536 Indonesia∗, (E)
39 218 Bolivia∗ 86 429 Iran, Islamic Rep.
40 616 Botswana, (E) 87 436 Israel∗, (E)
41 223 Brazil∗, (E) 88 343 Jamaica∗, (E)
42 918 Bulgaria∗, (E) 89 439 Jordan∗, (E)
43 748 Burkina Faso∗ 90 916 Kazakhstan∗
44 618 Burundi∗ 91 664 Kenya∗, (E)
45 662 Cote d’Ivoire∗, (E) 92 542 Korea, Rep. of∗, (E)
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93 443 Kuwait∗ 136 456 Saudi Arabia
94 917 Kyrgyz Republic∗ 137 722 Senegal∗
95 544 Lao PDR 138 718 Seychelles
96 941 Latvia∗ 139 724 Sierra Leone∗
97 446 Lebanon 140 576 Singapore∗, (E)
98 666 Lesotho 141 936 Slovak Republic∗, (E)
99 668 Liberia 142 961 Slovenia∗, (E)
100 672 Libya 143 813 Solomon Islands
101 946 Lithuania∗, (E) 144 199 South Africa∗, (E)
102 674 Madagascar∗ 145 524 Sri Lanka∗
103 676 Malawi 146 361 St. Kitts and Nevis
104 548 Malaysia∗, (E) 147 362 St. Lucia
105 556 Maldives 148 364 St. Vincent & the Grenadines
106 678 Mali∗ 149 732 Sudan
107 682 Mauritania∗ 150 366 Suriname
108 684 Mauritius∗, (E) 151 734 Swaziland∗
109 273 Mexico∗, (E) 152 463 Syrian Arab Republic
110 868 Micronesia, Fed. Sts. of 153 923 Tajikistan
111 921 Moldova 154 738 Tanzania∗
112 948 Mongolia∗ 155 578 Thailand∗, (E)
113 686 Morocco∗, (E) 156 742 Togo∗
114 688 Mozambique∗ 157 866 Tonga
115 518 Myanmar 158 369 Trinidad and Tobago, (E)
116 728 Namibia 159 744 Tunisia∗, (E)
117 558 Nepal∗ 160 186 Turkey∗, (E)
118 353 Netherlands Antilles 161 746 Uganda∗
119 278 Nicaragua 162 926 Ukraine
120 692 Niger∗ 163 298 Uruguay∗
121 694 Nigeria∗, (E) 164 846 Vanuatu
122 449 Oman 165 299 Venezuela, RB∗, (E)
123 564 Pakistan 166 582 Viet Nam∗, (E)
124 283 Panama∗ 167 474 Yemen, Rep.∗
125 853 Papua New Guinea 168 754 Zambia∗
126 288 Paraguay∗ 169 698 Zimbabwe∗, (E)
127 293 Peru∗, (E)
128 566 Philippines∗, (E)
129 964 Poland∗, (E)
130 453 Qatar (E) = emerging market economies.
131 968 Romania∗ Note: Countries with “∗” are the ones
132 922 Russian Federation∗, (E) included in the regression estimations.
133 714 Rwanda Source: Authors’ representations.
134 716 Sao Tome and Principe
135 862 Samoa
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Appendix 2: Crisis Identification
A2.1. Currency Crisis
We identify a currency crisis based on the conventional exchange rate market
pressure (EMP) index pioneered by Eichengreen et al. (1995, 1996). The EMP
index is defined as a weighted average of monthly changes in the nominal exchange
rate, the international reserve loss in percentage, and the nominal interest rate. The
nominal exchange rate is calculated against the base country used to construct the
trilemma indexes (see Aizenman et al. 2010).27 The weights are inversely related
to the pooled variance of changes in each component over the sample countries.
As many others do, we use two standard deviations of the EMP as the threshold to
identify a currency crisis. For countries where data for the EMP are not available,
we supplement the crisis dummy with currency crisis identification by Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009). The crisis dummy is available for 1970–2010.
A2.2. Banking Crisis
Identification of a banking crisis is based on data developed by Laeven and
Valencia (2008, 2010) and its update (Laeven and Valencia, 2012). Laeven and
Valencia (2008, 2010) define a systematic banking crisis if an economy is showing
“significant signs of financial distress in the banking system” (e.g., significant bank
runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations) and if the govern-
ment has taken “significant banking policy intervention measures in response to
significant losses in the banking system.” They consider “significant banking policy
intervention measures” to have been taken if at least three out of the following six
measures have been used: (i) extensive liquidity support (5% of deposits and liabil-
ities to nonresidents), (ii) bank restructuring gross costs (at least 3% of GDP), (iii)
significant bank nationalizations, (iv) significant guarantees, (v) significant asset
purchases (at least 5% of GDP), and (vi) deposit freezes and/or bank holidays. See
Laeven and Valencia (2008) for more details. We also supplement the data with the
Reinhart and Rogoff data. The data are available for 1970–2010.
A2.3. Debt Crisis
A debt crisis is identified using the dataset by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
They identify a sovereign default when a country fails to meet a principle or interest
payment on the due date. Alternatively, a debt crisis is identified when “rescheduled
27The “base country” is defined as the country that a home country’s monetary policy is most closely linked
with as in Shambaugh (2004). The base countries are Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, India, Malaysia, South
Africa, the United Kingdom, and the US. The base country can change, as in the case of Ireland. Ireland’s base
country was the UK until the mid-1970 s but changed to Germany since Ireland joined the EMS.
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debt is ultimately extinguished in terms less favorable than the original obligation.”
We also augment the Reinhart and Rogoff data using information from Babbel
(1995), Beim and Calomiris (2001), Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), and the World
Bank’s Global Development Finance (2012). The data are available for 1970–2010.
A2.4. Twin Crises
A twin crisis is identified when one type of crisis occurs while another type
occurs in the immediate previous year (t0 − 1), the same year (t0), or the immediate
following year (t0 + 1).
